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Abstract 
Trust funds – broadly defined as financial vehicles to channel development funding earmarked for 
specific purposes through international development organizations – have grown substantially over 
the past two decades. Reflecting the variety of trust fund purposes and related governance 
arrangements, an emergent literature emphasizes a diversity of reasons underlying this growth. This 
paper proposes a simple – yet encompassing – explanation applicable to all kinds of funds: Donors 
use trust funds to wield ‘influence’ – leveraging financial resources to alter the policies of multilateral 
organizations. Based on interviews at the World Bank, the study shows that influence is a dominant 
motive behind trust funds, though the capacity and willingness to wield influence varies across 
donors. Influence is a salient motive especially for medium-sized donors and emerging donors but 
surprisingly less so for large donors. In addition, attempts of influence are most effective when 
donors promote new thematic issues that did not previously feature Bank assistance and outside 
established programs. Concerns among stakeholders about undue donor influence are highest with 
respect to the global knowledge work of the World Bank but are virtually absent when involving 
donors in the operational activities at the country level. 
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Running title: Trust funds as a lever of influence 
1.  An influence perspective on the rise of trust funds  
In recent years, two phenomena have altered the development aid architecture. First, ‘global funds’ 
– such as the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria – have grown into serious 
competitors of the established multilateral organizations – such as the World Bank, the World Health 
Organization, and other United Nations entities (Smyth and Triponel, 2013; Sridhar and Woods, 
2013; Browne, 2017). Governed by independent boards in which donor countries control a majority 
of the votes, global funds act outside the established multilaterals but contract the latter as their 
implementing agencies. Donor countries committed more than USD 8 billion to global funds (OECD, 
2016), which implies that these funds channel a similar amount of earmarked funding to 
implementing multilaterals.1 Second, at the same time, donor countries have created ‘trust funds’ at 
multilateral organizations to channel development assistance earmarked for specific regions, 
countries, themes, or sectors (OECD, 2011; Reinsberg et al., 2015; Eichenauer and Reinsberg, 2017). 
In 2015, donor countries channeled about USD 20 billion as earmarked aid to multilateral 
organizations (OECD, 2016), and for many implementing multilaterals, earmarked funding accounts 
for the lion share of their development budgets. Over the past few years, the United Nations 
financed about 75% of its operational activities for development through earmarked aid (UN, 2012).  
These two trends tend to be analyzed separately. In this paper, I propose a unified approach to 
studying both kinds of phenomena: I argue that the common denominator underlying the popularity 
of multilateral funds for donors is ‘influence’ – the capacity of the donors to alter the behavior of 
other donors and multilateral agencies according to their own priorities. Capturing the relevant 
explanations for trust funds through the lens of influence has a key advantage: International 
Relations scholars have a keen interest in patterns of influence, for example when states use 
multilateral venues to advance unilateral interests, the conditions under which such attempts are 
successful, and through which mechanisms states wield influence (Kilby, 2009; Stone, 2011; Stone, 
2013). 
I pose three related research questions: 1) Do donors want to use trust funds as a lever of influence? 
2) In which ways do donors use trust funds to wield influence? And finally, 3) Are such attempts of 
donor influence effective in that they actually change the behavior of multilateral organizations? I 
address these questions based on evidence from 75 semi-structured interviews with donor 
representatives and staff members at the World Bank. Interviewees are drawn from different 
operational units in order to take into account different issue areas and types of activities supported 
through trust funds. In particular, World Bank trust funds can support country-level activities, 
including feasibility studies, technical assistance, and co-financing of projects managed by individual 
country units. They can also support the analytical work carried out by global thematic units. 
Moreover, trust funds vary in their membership, ranging from funds supported by only a single donor 
to multi-donor trust funds that include almost all major donor countries. The analysis shows that 
donor influence varies across different trust fund mechanisms, suggesting that donors choose these 
modalities strategically.  
The findings contribute to the emerging literature on trust funds and more generally the resourcing 
of international organizations in at least two ways. First, by systematically studying donor influence 
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along the three questions outlined above, I add to the rather anecdotal evidence on donor influence 
through trust funds (Reinsberg, 2016). Theoretically, I propose a general explanation applicable to 
both independent global funds and trust funds within multilateral organizations. Previous research 
tends to focus on either one or the other and develops separate explanations for these phenomena. 
As a noteworthy exception, Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Knack (2016) consider donor choices among 
different multilateral funds, arguing that each donor trades off individual control in small funds 
against burden-sharing benefits in large funds (regardless of whether or not these are legally 
independent). Second, I bridge two hitherto unconnected branches of literature – the one on 
informal governance in international organization and another one on trust funds – by showing that 
trust funds can be fruitfully understood as a means of influence beyond the formal influence that 
member states have through voting in the relevant boards of multilateral agencies. Although trust 
funds are based on formal agreements between the donor(s) and the trustee organization, their 
governance is informal with respect to the ability of an organization’s governing board to control 
these funds. Moreover, the politics of trust funds is by and large informal and hence can be seen as 
one mechanism through which financially forthcoming donors affect the policies of multilateral 
agencies.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the relevant literature along the 
theme of (informal) influence. Depending on the locus of influence and its ultimate goals, I identify 
four scenarios of influence and discuss the role of trust funds in each. Section 3 presents evidence of 
donor influence through trust funds using the case of the World Bank. Section 4 highlights key 
findings and avenues for future research.  
 
2.  Theoretical perspectives: State influence at international organizations 
The term ‘influence’ broadly refers to the ability of an actor to be a compelling force on the behavior 
of another actor (Cox and Jacobson, 1973, p. 3). When states seek international cooperation, they 
often delegate authority to international organizations to perform certain tasks on their behalf 
(Nielson and Tierney, 2003). Within a single organization, influence may inter alia relate to decisions 
regarding membership, programs, creation of rules, enforcement of rules, and operations (Cox and 
Jacobson, 1973, p. 9-12). I propose another categorization of influence based on two dimensions: 1) 
the addressee of influence, and 2) the locus of influence. This categorization is particularly useful for 
considering strategies of influence beyond single organizations and thus for so-called ‘regime 
complexes’ (Raustiala and Victor, 2004).  
The first dimension distinguishes between ‘unilateral influence’ and ‘collective influence.’ Unilateral 
influence refers to the attempts of one state to compel the behavior of other states (e.g., peer 
donors or recipient countries) by using international organizations as a channel of influence. In 
contrast, collective influence relates to the attempts of states to compel the behavior of the 
international organization to which they delegated certain tasks. The second dimension considers the 
level at which strategies of influence are located. On the one hand, states may choose inside options 
with respect to the international organization to achieve their goals (‘intra-organizational strategies’). 
On the other hand, states may use outside options that are external to the international organization 
(‘regime-level strategies’). The combination of these two dimensions yields a matrix with four cells 
 4 
 
(Table 1) populated by four distinct – yet hitherto loosely connected – branches of literature. Using 
the perspective of ‘influence,’ I aim to link these branches of literature and discuss the existing 
research on trust funds in each of them. ‘Trust funds,’ as used throughout this paper, are financial 
vehicles established under the institutional law of the host organization (Droesse, 2011, p. 113), 
which makes them different from ‘pass-through multilaterals,’ independent multilateral entities 
established outside the legal framework but using the implementing capacities of traditional 
multilateral organizations (Heimans, 2004; Isenman and Shakow, 2010; Browne, 2017). 
Table 1: A systematic overview of studies on influence  
 Intra-organizational strategies Regime-level strategies 
Unilateral influence Unilateral donor influence 
within international 
organizations 
Forum-shopping  
Collective influence Collective control mechanisms 
within international 
organizations 
Inter-agency competition and 
functional differentiation 
 
Unilateral donor influence  
States wield unilateral influence through three channels: formal power, structural power, and 
informal power (Stone, 2013). Hereby, power refers to the ‘aggregate political resources available to 
an actor’ that can be turned into influence (Cox and Jacobson, 1973, p. 3). Wealthy states are more 
powerful in all respects, for example because they have more votes in the formal governing bodies of 
the international financial institutions. They also have valuable unilateral outside options that give 
them more leverage to wield influence. In terms of operational influence, wealthy states have 
greater capacity to influence the day-to-day activities of international organizations. In contrast, 
small states have tiny delegations that must split their attention across different managerial duties 
(Cox and Jacobson, 1973, p. 198).  
Oftentimes informal influence by powerful member states accounts for departures from formal rules, 
which therefore can only partly explain the behavior of international organizations (Kleine, 2013; 
Stone, 2013; Westerwinter, 2015). A voluminous literature provides evidence of informal influence, 
for a broad range of organizations including the International Monetary Fund (e.g., Thacker, 1999; 
Steinwand and Stone, 2008), the World Bank (e.g., Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland, 2009; Kilby, 2009), 
and other development banks (e.g., Kilby, 2011; Lim and Vreeland, 2013). Studies in this tradition 
find that recipient countries that enjoy close political relations with the United States receive 
favorable treatment from these international organizations, which supports the interpretation that 
the United States exerts informal influence to the benefit of its political and economic allies. Despite 
this rich body of evidence, mechanisms of influence remain underresearched.  
Trust funds can be a means of unilateral donor influence at international development organizations. 
Concerns are widespread that donors might potentially use trust funds to advance idiosyncratic 
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interests, leaving multilateral agencies in the role of mere implementers of bilateral priorities (UN, 
2012; Browne and Weiss, 2014; Reinsberg, 2016). Scholars especially scrutinize single-donor trust 
funds because these funds offer the greatest potential for discretionary influence. Reinsberg, 
Michaelowa, and Knack (2016) show that bilateral donors use single-donor trust funds primarily in 
areas where their salient national interests are at stake, for example when channeling aid to middle-
income countries. While this analysis demonstrates unilateral donor influence at a programmatic 
level, research is yet to extend to operational influence through trust funds. 
Collective control mechanisms  
States may also wield collective influence vis-à-vis an international organization. According to 
principal-agent literature, international organizations are at risk to become unfaithful to their original 
mandates because they may not have the same preferences as their principals while having an 
informational advantage. States therefore need to install control mechanisms – ‘police patrol’ and 
‘fire alarms’ – to mitigate agency slack (Pollack, 1997; Nielson and Tierney, 2003; Hawkins et al., 
2006). A more subtle way of influence is reflected in the network ties between donor officials and 
agency staff. In line with this mechanism, Dijkstra (2015) shows that donor governments create 
‘shadow bureaucracies’ to monitor a multilateral agency in areas in which they have salient interests. 
Recent literature emphasizes that states can control the resources of an agency in order to limit its 
autonomy (Brown, 2010; Manulak, 2016; Conceição-Heldt and Schmidtke, 2017; Ege and Bauer, 
2017; Squatrito, 2017). One such resource is staff (Parízek, 2016). International organizations seek to 
grow their staff body (Vaubel, Dreher, and Soylu, 2007), but they are not always able to do so unless 
states need expertise (Johnson and Urpelainen, 2014). States may even send their own experts to 
international organizations to relay back information from inside the agency. Another key resource 
refers to financial contributions. While previous studies suggest that donors can pressure for policy 
change through the ‘power of the purse’ – limiting the level of their contributions – more recent 
contributions emphasize the composition of funding. In particular, dependence on voluntary 
provision of resources essential to institutional functions, such as funds, troops, or technical 
expertise substantially limits the discretion of multilateral agencies vis-à-vis their principals (Goetz 
and Patz, 2016; Manulak, 2016; Reinsberg, 2016).  
Trust funds – by virtue of providing earmarked funding that limits agent autonomy – are widely 
understood as mechanisms of collective influence. Donors use them to advance certain issue areas 
that not all donors perceive as a priority and hence are not willing to support through core 
contributions. Graham (2016) shows for the United Nations that preference divergence among the 
donors predicts the design of earmarked funding rules. Furthermore, donors with expansionary 
preferences use earmarking to make agencies work in new areas. In the case of the World Bank, the 
Nordic donors were ‘much more financially forthcoming relative to their economic wealth than the 
United States’ and bypassed the formal budgetary process, providing supplementary trust fund 
resources in exchange for policy influence (Kapur, 2002, p. 63). 
Apparently, it is the less powerful, yet affluent donors that use trust funds to induce multilateral 
agencies to work in their priority areas. This is because small donors do not have much leverage to 
threaten withdrawal of resources, because their contributions do not make a difference in the overall 
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multilateral agency budget. However, small donors can incentivize multilateral agency staff through 
additional financial contributions to work in new issue areas. 
Forum-shopping 
An individual state may not limit its efforts of influence to a particular organization but consider the 
whole set of agencies within a policy field. A state can use its simultaneous membership in several 
institutions that all could in principle address a given policy issue to hold out for the best deal. Such 
so-called ‘forum shopping’ is a deliberate strategy pursued by states of choosing the venues that 
advance their own interests most (Benvenisti, 2006; Foreman and Segaar, 2006). Urpelainen and van 
de Graaf (2015) suggest that a dissatisfied ‘challenger state’ creates an overlapping institution when 
the currently focal institution is captured by interests opposed to the challenger. This seems to 
suggest that forum-shopping is a strategy of the powerful states as it requires well-staffed diplomatic 
missions to set the agenda across different international policy-making venues.  
When it comes to designing new such venues, Manulak (2016) shows that powerful states prefer 
weak secretariats over powerful secretariats in institutional design negotiations and that the actual 
design reflects their bargaining clout with respect to less powerful states that favor stronger 
secretariats. In a similar vein, Stone (2011) argues that powerful states often commit to limit their 
own formal power because they expect downstream informal influence advantages. Urpelainen 
(2012) confirms this argument by showing that formal international agreements often favor 
institutionally weak states that are disadvantaged in the unilateral influence contest. 
Trust funds – which can be understood as informal governance with respect to the established 
formal governance procedure – have been found to further the interests of donors with 
expansionary policy agendas and thus can be seen as tools for forum-shopping. For example, Graham 
(2016) presents the historical example of the United Nations Development Program in the mid-
1960s, when the Netherlands and other interested donors made contributions earmarked for special 
industrial services. In general, the evidence thus far also suggests that trust funds hosted at 
multilateral organizations complement multilateral activities financed from core contributions. In a 
statistical analysis, Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Eichenauer (2015) do not find evidence that multi-bi 
aid (channeled through trust funds) would mitigate the growth rate of core contributions to 
multilateral organizations. Moreover, anecdotal evidence for the World Bank suggests that trust 
funds (despite providing additional resources to ongoing operations) extend the scope of operations 
beyond the formal mandate (IEG, 2011). 
Inter-agency competition  
Inter-agency competition is another regime-level strategy of gaining influence. The distinction to 
forum-shopping is blurry, but inter-agency competition is more directly aimed at altering the policies 
of the legacy institution. While the reasons for forum-shopping may be idiosyncratic, the reasons for 
creating new institutions outside a legacy institution often relate to collective action problems such 
as stalemate in the formal governing bodies of legacy institutions, the urgency of joint challenges, 
and legitimacy concerns (Kahler, 1992; Benvenisti, 2006; Forman and Segaar, 2006; Eckersley, 2012). 
In such cases, states often establish informal intergovernmental organizations (Vabulas and Snidal, 
2013). An example of such an informal arrangement is the G20, which held a key to reform the 
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International Monetary Fund in the wake of the recent global financial crisis and hence ensured its 
long-term sustainability (Albaret, 2013). While it has long been argued that institutional creation is 
the domain of the powerful states, some scholars consider informal organizations in particular to be 
a tool of the relatively weaker states (Helfer, 2004; Benvenisti, 2006; Vabulas and Snidal, 2013).  
In a famous article, Helfer (2004) coined the practice of ‘regime shifting’, discussing how developing 
countries shifted debates on Intellectual Property Rights from the World Trade Organization to the 
World Intellectual Property Organization. On the one hand, developing countries engaged in forum 
shopping because they had more clout in the latter organization. On the other hand, by recurring to 
an agency with similar duties, they also induced competition for the World Trade Organization and 
increased its incentives to be more responsive to their own preferences. In general, ‘functional 
overlap’ serves to induce competition between rival agencies, challenging their respective 
‘bureaucratic monopolies’ (Gehring and Faude, 2014). While hopes are that competition increases 
performance, it is also possible that the adoption of new legal provisions undermine the original 
arrangements (Shaffer and Pollack, 2010, p. 709). In fact, resort to alternative venues could ‘sideline 
organizations such as the United Nations on the most important issues of the day’ (Forman and 
Segaar, 2006, p. 221).  
The recent growth of global funds – established outside existing institutional frameworks – suggests 
that donors seek to influence the behavior of the multilateral organizations whose business model 
the global funds claim to challenge. For example, Sridhar and Woods (2013) present evidence to 
suggest that donors created the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria to influence the 
World Health Organization. Accordingly, donors were unable to control the World Health 
Organizations on key policies. By earmarking their financial contributions, donors reduced the policy 
discretion of the agency and thus increased their collective control. 
Donors have replicated the global fund model in several other instances. The Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) was the first entity to be established outside established institutions due to ‘the loss of 
confidence in the capacity of those institutions to address the need in question.’ In fact, donors 
wanted to avoid a solution too close to the World Bank because it had a bad record on 
environmental protection at that time and donors feared the Bank would use GEF resources to boost 
its own lending agenda (Smyth and Triponel, 2013, p. 59). In the case of the reconstituted Global 
Partnership on Education (GPE), donors wanted to break free from the restrictions of the World Bank 
in order to increase their allocations to countries with poor governance.  
The above examples indicate that donors chose the venue for influence strategically. This leads to 
the expectation that when donors establish an entirely new institution (outside the institutional 
framework of the existing organizations) they seek to ‘do things differently’ and avoid too much 
policy autonomy for the existing organization. When they use trust funds hosted inside the 
multilateral organization, their motivations are more ambivalent – but certainly they are more likely 
to value the work of the agency and to trust its operational procedures. When using global funds, 
donors wield different types of influence compared to when using trust funds. In both cases, donors 
can influence programmatic decisions by initiating new programs and controlling multilaterals’ 
resource allocations; however, while trust funds are more useful for operational influence, global 
funds reflect influence in the domain of membership (as the governance of global funds privileges 
donors compared to their respective position in the governance of the legacy institutions).  
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In summary, the above framework has shown that influence is the common denominator of all 
strategies but it is geared toward different aims. In all cases, states deploy or redirect resources to 
wield influence: Intra-organizational strategies seek to directly affect agency resources (which is 
possible in a rather short time horizon and hence affect actual practice), while regime-level strategies 
indirectly affect resources by shaping the competitive environment of a given agency (which 
naturally takes longer and involves institutional (re)design). In terms of which states are most likely 
to wield influence, rich states theoretically should be in a better position to do so because their 
resource contributions are often vital to the functioning of international organizations, their outside 
options are often better and hence imply that their threats to withdraw funding are more credible, 
and they are more capable of unilateral influence due to well-resourced delegations to monitor 
agency operations and to establish deeper ties with agency staff. In the realm of institutional design, 
however, these potential advantages may turn into bargaining disadvantages because less powerful 
states want protection against too much big power influence at the operational level (Manulak, 
2016). 
 
3.  Case study: Trust funds and donor influence at the World Bank 
To study how donors use trust funds as a lever of influence, I examine the case of the World Bank. 
For the purpose of this study, the World Bank consists of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA), given that its 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) is less relevant for development cooperation with 
governments and only manages a small portion of the trust fund portfolio. The World Bank was 
chosen because it can be seen as a hard case for donor influence. Trust funds play a relatively small 
role in its operations given that the World Bank primarily is a lending institution and trust funds 
complement its business with grant resources. Moreover, the World Bank is a leader of development 
thinking and therefore a significant share of trust-funded initiatives are developed by Bank staff 
rather than being imposed from the outside (Reinsberg, 2017). If donor influence was to be found in 
the World Bank context, it would be even more salient in financially less autonomous multilateral 
organizations. 
Given the well-established evidence on donor influence through pass-through multilaterals, I remain 
brief on this issue but rather focus on trust funds hosted by the Bank itself. My analysis draws on 75 
semi-structured interviews conducted at World Bank headquarters during July and August 2013.2 
Given that influence is notoriously hard to measure, qualitative analysis is the preferable method.3 
Moreover, interviews are useful even when they capture perceived influence, not actual influence, 
because these perceptions will shape the behavior of agency staff. 
Building on the theoretical discussion in the previous section, I examine the following three issues. 
First, I explore whether or not World Bank staff perceives trust funds to be an instrument of donor 
influence and, if so, what motivates donors to do so. Second, I analyze how donors wield influence, 
and whether or not the strategies of different types of donors differ. I consider large donors (with a 
lot of formal power) and small donors (with little formal power). Third, I seek to assess whether 
attempts of donor influence are successful, touching on the potential consequences for the World 
Bank.  
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Donor influence through trust funds 
Only a few interviewees mentioned that donors sought to influence the World Bank by establishing 
independent multilateral institutions outside the World Bank (yet no interviewee mentioned the 
opposite). An experienced official said that ‘it was arrogant how the Bank dealt with its partners and 
this led to the proliferation of boards – anti-Bank trust funds.’4 The ‘lack of transparency’ regarding 
how IDA projects are approved and the ‘rigidity of formal procedures’ further undermined the trust  
of some donors in the World Bank, leading them to favor venues outside the institutional framework 
of the Bank.5 Another official from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) secretariat argued that 
‘donors use the GEF to influence the World Bank,’6 explaining how they pushed for enhanced 
fiduciary standards and social standards in the Governing Council that went beyond the related 
provisions at the World Bank and other implementing agencies. The same official also speculated 
that influence considerations might have been relevant as to why donors agreed to the 
establishment of the Green Climate Fund – an entity that is even more independent from the World 
Bank than the Global Environment Facility. 
While these are the only two interviewees who explicitly mentioned regime-level strategies of donor 
influence, evidence is more plenty for trust funds hosted at the World Bank. Many interviewees 
agreed that ‘donors want to push the Bank into new issue areas.’7 For example, the Nordic donors 
wanted to promote a human rights agenda inside the Bank and therefore established the Nordic 
Trust Fund, which was eventually approved by the Executive Board.8 In contrast, there is no evidence 
that large donors use trust funds to promote specific policies. The Executive Director from the United 
States said: ‘I am less certain we use trust funds in a way to steer the Bank in a certain direction.’9 
Another motivation for influence is not related to substantive policy but procedural insurances: 
Donor governments need to account for their contributions before domestic auditors and their own 
constituents. Trust funds indeed trigger special reporting requirements that enable donors to 
demonstrate results back home for their multilateral contributions.10  
Attempts of influence are not limited to big powers. To the contrary, especially smaller states are 
desperate to wield influence and hence punch above their formal as reflected in their share of votes 
in the Executive Board. The Australian Executive Director said: ‘In the Pacific context, the idea of 
influencing Bank policies is interesting.’ The flexibility of trust funds makes them a useful instrument 
to channel aid according to salient partisan interests: ‘Since trust funds are often single-use 
instruments with clear purpose and clear timeframe, they fit with government thinking.’11 The choice 
of a trust fund portfolio does not seem to reflect a desire for influence at first sight, but by 
supporting specific priorities through the underlying trust funds, a donor naturally provides 
incentives for the Bank to adjust its activities. This is evidence of influence.  
While so far all influence seems to be geared toward specific development issues, it may in principle 
be used to advance self-serving purposes. An experienced official claimed that ‘donors want to 
expand their sphere of influence beyond their bilateral programs’ and accused the United States of 
being ‘the worst abuser [that] uses trust funds for its own foreign policy agenda.’12 The Executive 
Director from that country said: ‘There are other levers [than trust funds] we can use as largest 
shareholder […]’13 In fact, as is well known, the United States leveraged IDA contributions to 
influence IBRD policies in the 1990s.14   
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A final issue is what it tells about the relationship between the donors and the Bank if these donors 
increasingly rely on trust funds. For a regional trust fund coordinator, the growing use of trust funds 
implies that donors value the World Bank as an entrusted partner ‘with a large network on the 
ground.’15 Bank staff also mentioned cost-effectiveness: Compared to its competitor trustees, the 
Bank charges only a small management fee. An Executive Director from a small donor country 
summarized that the Bank ‘has its comparative advantages.’16  
In sum, donors indeed use trust funds (as well as the global funds established outside the Bank) as a 
tool of unilateral influence, primarily to promote specific development themes and procedural 
reforms, but less so to further other foreign policy objectives. Moreover, medium-sized donors seek 
more influence than large donors. 
Mechanisms of influence  
My interviews suggest that donors influence the Bank through trust funds at two levels. First, donors 
wield widespread influence at the programmatic level. They determine fund priorities at the design 
stage as well as when they reconvene annually to review the program.17 This sort of influence is 
natural – trust funds enable donors to pursue programmatic priorities that they would otherwise not 
be able to pursue through the formal governing mechanism.  
Second, donor influence can extend to the operational level. At the operational level, donors are 
heterogeneous and possibilities for influence vary across funding type. As a general rule, donors are 
less willing and less able to wield operational influence with increasing number of other donors in the 
trust fund. But even within multi-donor trust funds, donors increasingly challenge the common 
framework and seek to inscribe certain restrictions on their contributions (through so-called 
‘notional earmarking’). In rare cases, for example when the trust fund supports a theme that does 
not traditionally feature in Bank assistance, donors influence the allocation of funds to concrete 
projects as they are part of the relevant vetting committees.18 Some single-donor trust funds by 
design enable donors to vet project proposals, but this is common only among ‘new donors’ 
(emerging economies) and Asian donors.19   
Patterns of influence also differ across types of activities that the trust funds support. For trust funds 
at the country level – typically recipient-executed trust funds – donor involvement is almost 
uncontroversial from the perspective of Bank staff. In general, the Bank allows donors to participate 
in its supervision missions.20 There seems to be demand, especially from regional donors. In the 
words of an Executive Director: ‘We have always pushed for joint missions, for example in Jakarta.’21 
In another region, the Bank accepted the quest from a lead donor to have its technical staff 
participating on the ground.22 In-country collaboration is often essential for project success and 
donor engagement is less driven by the desire to influence the Bank but to share knowledge to the 
mutual benefit.  
For Bank-executed trust funds – trust funds supporting the generation of global knowledge and 
analytical work – donor involvement more unambiguously reflects a desire for influence. Bank 
officials interviewed warned that the Bank should not rely too much on Bank-executed trust funds 
because these funds easily substitute the ‘Bank budget’ – the administrative budget of the Bank that 
it can use to fund activities at its own discretion – and can be used by donors to infiltrate 
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development thinking of Bank staff.23 According to one trust fund manager, one strategy to wield 
influence through trust funds is a ‘straight augmentation of the Bank budget’ – for example to 
finance studies. In fact, the United Kingdom almost exclusively financed the work on the ‘World 
Development Report’ in FY 2013. This issue caused heated debates in the Executive Board.24 An 
Executive Director from a large donor country (known as being skeptical toward trust funds) said it 
made him concerned that half of the knowledge products from the Bank are funded from trust funds. 
His conclusion was that ‘obviously you can have influence [through trust funds] beyond what is 
proportional to your share and which undermines the current governance structure.’25 Supporting 
this claim, Bank staff complained that donors sometimes want to ‘clear reports – a common practice 
among SIDA, DFID, NORAD, the Netherlands, the European Commission, and also Korea, but less so 
among USAID, Spain, Italy, and Ireland’26 One program manager further complained about undue 
influence because ‘donors wanted to comment on […] research results before publication.’27 
Influence also is a matter of time. In general, the Bank has sought to involve donors more upstream 
and donors have reduced their appetite for influence.28 For example, the Bank-Netherlands 
Partnership Program was the primary lever for the Netherlands to promote results orientation and 
specific sectors yet uncharted by the Bank. Arguing that these objectives were achieved, the 
Netherlands phased out the program in FY 2012. Before termination of the program, the Netherlands 
pulled back from vetting individual projects.29 More recently, the Board has become more unified 
toward the position that ‘trust funds are growing, hence we must make sure that this is not distorting 
[…] and that there is no influence through the back door.’30 The Board added one pillar to the existing 
regulations to strengthen information sharing. Some middle-income countries in concert with a few 
donors even pushed for the requirement of full approval of all trust funds by the Board because they 
feared that donors would have too much influence on countries that are large recipients of trust 
funds.  
Finally, the willingness to exert influence – particularly to micromanage aid programs – is a function 
of the economic cycle. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, donors tightened their monitoring 
activities in trust funds.31 For example, a manager of a global program reported a general trend ‘to 
wield more influence’, and particularly during the financial crisis, ‘the United Kingdom applie[d] more 
scrutiny on budgets due to own cutbacks.’32 A regional trust fund coordinator summarized that ‘the 
financial crisis has changed things […] donors have come under more pressure to account for aid 
money’, and ‘earmarking is the second challenge.’33  
In sum, donors wield influence through trust funds in multiple ways and at various levels. While trust 
funds almost always imply programmatic influence, they do not necessarily give donors operational 
influence. Operational influence is uncontroversial or even beneficial at the country level, but more 
controversial at the sector level when it comes to the global knowledge work of the Bank. With the 
financial crisis and the associated pressures on aid budgets, many donors have sought greater 
influence on operational procedures.    
Effectiveness of attempts to wield influence through trust funds 
In general, interviewees acknowledge that trust funds visibly shape World Bank operations. An 
adviser explained: ‘Political change in donor countries has a huge influence […] trust fund priorities 
reflect donor rhetoric from five years earlier.’34Conversely, a legal adviser argued that ‘it is very hard 
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to influence the policy agenda of the Bank through trust funds […] it does not seed the work of the 
Bank.’35 Whether or not attempts of donor influence are really effective depends on the substance of 
the issues at hand, the types of activities and where they are managed, and the experience of staff in 
negotiating with donors.  
First, there is a difference between development programs and operational rules. All interviewees 
confirm that donors cannot use trust funds to circumvent operational rules. A legal advisor stated 
that if a donor has requirements that are incommensurate with World Bank operational policies, the 
World Bank cannot accept the money. The advisor gave the example of the ‘ABC policy’ – a distinct 
approach to dealing with HIV/AIDS in development programs mandated by the United States that is 
not commensurate with World Bank rules.36 Another issue is national procurement. A central unit 
staff member explained that ‘some donors want national companies to benefit from trust funds, 
especially the midsized centralized donors and the “new donors” which did not yet make the 
disastrous experience with tied procurement as DFID and the Nordics.’37 The Bank can only accept 
earmarking if it does not discriminate any particular donor. The only case where aid tying is possible 
is the donor-funded staffing program, through which a given donor can finance a staff position to be 
filled with its own national.38  
Second, the types of activities supported through the trust fund affect the efficacy of donor 
influence. According to a regional trust fund coordinator, ‘micromanagement is more an issue with 
the networks [the global sector units at Bank headquarters].’39Another regional trust fund 
coordinator said: ‘Donors push hard, but we say “no” […] we only accept contributions when they fit 
our work program, we are not a contractor.’40 Conversely, in the network units, trust funds have 
often paved the way for new issue areas that became mainstreamed into Bank work. An official from 
a central unit stated: ‘Trust funds should go into innovative issues, but the World Bank must strike a 
balance with alignment with its own priorities.’41 Influence is particularly evident in high-salience 
issues, for example results-based management. A trust fund manager acknowledged that in that 
program, ‘donors wanted to push the Bank and it did work: the results-based management agenda is 
now mainstreamed.’ Moreover, ‘donors have put rules in place to make sure that the trust fund is 
not taken over by the Bank – for example a panel of experts with donor representatives or a 
threshold on the percentage of funds that could benefit Bank-executed activities.’42 This quote 
suggests that donor influence is greatest at the design stage.43 The risk is that the Bank might lose 
legitimacy in the eyes of developing countries because it falls prey to donor agendas. According to a 
central unit official, ‘the Bank still has not proven that trust funds would not displace its own 
priorities.’44 
Third, donors have great leverage in the design stage – the phase in which they negotiate with Bank 
staff on the governance of the fund. According to Bank rules, earmarking is not possible in multi-
donor trust funds, but donors can negotiate indicative preferences into the administrative 
agreement that Bank staff try to (and usually do) satisfy. This has led to the proliferation of ‘windows’ 
within multi-donor trust funds.45 While indicative preferences can be included in the administrative 
agreement, donors maintain even more flexibility by also using ‘notional earmarking’ during the 
operational phase of trust funds. One global program manager said donors could not earmark in 
theory, but ‘we try to accommodate their priorities,’ for example by asking for country lists 
(indicating which countries shall be assisted or not with the respective donor contribution).  
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Evidence of influence is not limited to the design stage though. Several interviewees (notably, at 
upper management levels) assert that there is no donor interference once trust funds are 
established.46 For example, Bank staff insist that project selection is entirely in the hands of the Bank. 
A regional trust fund coordinator said: ‘We cannot allow donors to select projects.’47 However, staff 
members from operations report different experiences. A program manager gave the following 
hypothetical example on typical considerations of Bank-internal project selection committee 
members: ‘If project proposals come in from Panama and Uganda, and donors know better Uganda, 
then they will be more critical on Panama, so the Uganda project is more likely to get funding 
upfront.’48 This is evidence of anticipatory obedience, which is also reflected in the statement of 
another program manager: ‘We need to stay in good terms with [donors].’49  
The above quotes indicate evidence of donor influence at all stages of the trust fund cycle and across 
different trust fund programs. Structural criteria can explain some variation in the effectiveness of 
donor influence. As one manager from a small program speculated: ‘Probably the rules are stricter in 
the established programs, but we are a niche, a boutique shop, and hence donors have more 
leverage.’50 Notwithstanding the structural differences, residual variation often relates to the 
individual experience of trust fund managers and donor officials, because every new trust fund 
involves a bargaining relationship in which both sides learn. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
This paper examined to what extent donors use trust funds as a lever of influence at international 
development organizations. Theoretically, I distinguished four scenarios of influence that result from 
the interaction of two dimensions – the purpose of influence (whether it serves idiosyncratic goals of 
a donor or whether it aims at changing multilateral agency policies), and the locus of influence 
(whether donors directly influence a given organization or whether they do so by altering the regime 
in which the organization operates). My review of the relevant literature indicated that donors wield 
influence at all levels. As to the locus of influence, donors have used regime-level strategies by 
creating global funds in issue areas such as health, education, and the environment. As a source of 
earmarked funding, these global funds enable donors to wield programmatic influence over 
established multilaterals, while also wielding symbolic influence (given their high visibility) and 
challenging their universal representation. While global funds undermine established multilaterals as 
policy-making venues, they rely on the latter for implementation of development programs. A recent 
literature on ‘orchestration’ – a mode of governance in which a focal organization coordinates policy 
and works through several intermediaries for the benefit of some ultimate targets – emphasizes the 
merits of such division of labor by design (Abbott, Genschel, Snidal, and Zangl, 2015). 
In addition, donors have used intra-organizational strategies by supporting special-purpose trust 
funds hosted inside multilateral organizations. These trust funds can be used to wield programmatic 
influence and operational influence. Using a vast number of interviews with World Bank staff and 
Executive Directors, I have shown that donors seek influence through trust funds and their respective 
attempts are often successful. In rare cases (if at all), donors used trust funds to further their 
idiosyncratic objectives. In most cases, a group of donors with like-minded preferences established a 
trust fund to promote certain development themes that did not previously feature in World Bank 
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activities, for example good governance, human rights, gender equality, and fragile states. 
Surprisingly, these trust funds were the tool of medium-sized donors rather than large donors, which 
apparently have other means to advocate for policy change. This might relate to the fact that small 
donors as opposed to large donors have not much leverage to threaten withdrawal of core 
contributions, but they can incentivize agency staff to explore new areas by promising additional 
trust fund contributions.  
While the evidence suggests a generally declining trend of donor influence, the issue is still relevant 
and might become further relevant as the economic situation in many donor countries deteriorates. 
Moreover, ‘new donors’ (emerging market economies), which are known among Bank staff for their 
tighter control of resources, might further increase their trust fund contributions. Moreover, as 
administrative budgets at many organizations stagnate, donors are increasingly able to influence the 
agenda on analytical work that would usually be covered by these budgets but that is covered to a 
considerable extent by trust funds.  
This paper has focused on the World Bank to examine the issue of donor influence through trust 
funds, but its results are applicable beyond the World Bank context. UN agencies and the World Bank 
are similar in important ways: Both are ‘service organizations’ rather than ‘forum organizations’ (Cox 
and Jacobson, 1973), which implies that in both organizations, the same types of decisions (i.e., 
programmatic and operational) and pathways of influence (i.e., initiation and control) predominate. 
UN agencies have structural features that make them even more susceptible to donor influence. In 
particular, UN agencies are completely dependent on donor outlays; big portions of their budgets are 
earmarked, mostly for individual projects. The predominance of single-donor trust funds also implies 
greater potential for influence even at operational levels.  
Future research might take a more analytical stance and explain why donors want influence, why 
agencies accept such influence (beyond the obvious reason that they need resources to stay 
relevant), and under which conditions donors opt for regime-level strategies versus intra-
organizational strategies to wield influence. Another issue relates to the conditions of success of 
influence, which can be attributed to state power (as discussed in this paper), the collective 
configuration of donor interests and the intensity of such interests, and negotiator characteristics. 
Finally, future research could examine the relative weight of ‘influence’ in comparison with other 
motives underlying the use of trust funds, using quantitative research methods. One alternative 
motive for why a donor may use trust funds is lack of capacity (Michaelowa et al., 2016). Moreover, 
trust funds may be instrumental to roll over aid budgets into the subsequent year, given that in many 
countries, donor bureaucracies have to spend their funds at the end of the year. Finally, a trust fund 
may have a ceremonial purpose, enabling the donor to respond to domestic pressure to act upon 
specific development issues. Examining these questions would further contribute to our 
understanding of trust funds as a new phenomenon in multilateral development finance. 
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1 The figure of USD 8 billion excludes the European Union, which has become a pass-through multilateral in 
recent years (Michaelowa et al., 2016).  
2 The analysis draws on 25 out of these 75 interviews. The interviews not referenced here provided important 
background information on World Bank trust funds but did not explicitly cover issues related to donor 
influence. 
3 Influence is hard to measure because it is essentially an estimate of the strength of the relationship between 
policy goals and actual outcomes from the perspective of the wielding actor. 
4 Interview 65 with Lead Operations Officer (August 26, 2013) 
5 Since FY 2012, the Bank has made public the minutes of Executive Board meetings but ‘a lot is still arcane.’ 
6 Interview 61 with Head of Operations (August 22, 2013) 
7 Interview 65; Interview 20 with Legal Counsel (July 31, 2013); Interview 13 with Coordinator (July 26, 2013); 
Interview 47 with Operations Officer (August 12, 2013)   
8 Interview 13 
9 Interview 58 with Executive Director (August 20, 2013) 
10 Interview 3 with Partnership Adviser (July 19, 2013); Interview 20 
11 Interview 56 with Adviser to Executive Director (August 19, 2013) 
12 Interview 65 
13 Interview 58 
14 Interviews 20 and 58 
15 Interview 7 with Trust Fund Coordinator (July 24, 2013) 
16 Interview 69 with Adviser to Executive Director (August 27, 2013) 
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17 Interview 27 with Trust Fund Coordinator (August 2, 2013); Interview 73 with Senior Operations Officer 
(August 28, 2013)  
18 Interview 12 with Trust Fund Manager (July 26, 2013) 
19 Interview 44 with Senior Operations Officer (August 9, 2013) 
20 Interview 27 
21 Interview 56 
22 Interview 27 
23 Interview 7 
24 Interview 49 with Manager (August 13, 2013). Especially Switzerland was echoing concerns of developing 
countries in the Board on the lack of control of trust funds. 
25 Interview 59 with Adviser to Executive Director (August 21, 2013) 
26 Interview 65 
27 Interview 73 
28 Interview 49 
29 Interview 42 with Senior Operations Officer (August 9, 2013) 
30 Interview 49 
31 Interview 48 with Senior Partnership Specialist (August 13, 2013); Interview 49; Interview 52 with Program 
Officer (August 14, 2013); Interview 65; Interview 68 with Trust Fund Coordinator (August 27, 2013) 
32 Interview 52 
33 Interview 68 
34 Interview 1 with Adviser (central unit) (July 15, 2013) 
35 Interview 20 
36 Interview 20 
37 Interview 48 
38 Historically, the other exception was a makeshift trust fund in the 1990s. In this trust fund, supported by all 
donors except the United States, donors excluded American companies from contract award because the 
United States withheld their IDA contributions to pressure for reform (Weaver, 2007).  
39 Interview 51 with Trust Fund Coordinator (August 14, 2013) 
40 Interview 19 with Trust Fund Coordinator (July 31, 2013) 
41 Interview 47 
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42 Interview 67 with Sector Manager (August 26, 2013) 
43 Interview 12 
44 Interview 65 
45 Interview 68 
46 Interview 12; Interview 11 with Senior Operations Officer (July 26, 2013) 
47 Interview 27 
48 Interview 12 
49 Interview 73 
50 Interview 52 
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Supplemental appendix 
Table A1: List of interviews 
ID Position Staff type Date 
1  Adviser Central Units 15.07.2013 
2  Lead Economist Task Team Leader 15.07.2013 
3  Partnership Advisor Trust Fund Coordinator 19.07.2013 
4  Trust Fund Coordinator Trust Fund Coordinator 23.07.2013 
5  Trust Fund Coordinator Trust Fund Coordinator 23.07.2013 
6  Senior Operations Officer Task Team Leader 23.07.2013 
7  Trust Fund Coordinator Trust Fund Coordinator 24.07.2013 
8  Consultant Central Units 24.07.2013 
9  Senior Resource Management Officer Trust Fund Coordinator 24.07.2013 
10  Trust Fund Coordinator Trust Fund Coordinator 25.07.2013 
11  Senior Operations Officer Task Team Leader 26.07.2013 
12  Trust Fund Manager Task Team Leader 26.07.2013 
13  Coordinator Task Team Leader 26.07.2013 
14  Lead Economist Central Units 29.07.2013 
15  Donor focal point Central Units 30.07.2013 
16  Trust Fund Coordinator Trust Fund Coordinator 30.07.2013 
17  Senior Resource Management Officer Central Units 30.07.2013 
18  Operations Officer Central Units 30.07.2013 
19  Trust Fund Coordinator Trust Fund Coordinator 31.07.2013 
20  Legal Counsel Central Units 31.07.2013 
21  Legal Counsel Central Units 31.07.2013 
22  Program Manager Task Team Leader 01.08.2013 
23  Senior Economist Task Team Leader 01.08.2013 
24  Senior Operations Officer Task Team Leader 01.08.2013 
25  Adviser Task Team Leader 02.08.2013 
26  Senior Transport Specialist Task Team Leader 02.08.2013 
27  Trust Fund Coordinator Trust Fund Coordinator 02.08.2013 
28  Program Manager Task Team Leader 02.08.2013 
29  Senior Adviser  05.08.2013 
30  Co-financing Officer Task Team Leader 06.08.2013 
31  Senior Partnership Specialist Trust Fund Coordinator 06.08.2013 
32  Senior Operations Officer Central Units 06.08.2013 
33  Senior Adviser  06.08.2013 
34  Senior Governance Specialist Task Team Leader 07.08.2013 
35  Senior Adviser  07.08.2013 
36  Managing Director Central Units 08.08.2013 
37  Adviser  08.08.2013 
38  Senior Program Officer Central Units 08.08.2013 
39  Senior Partnership Specialist Central Units 08.08.2013 
40  Director Task Team Leader 08.08.2013 
41  Director Central Units 09.08.2013 
42  Senior Operations Officer Central Units 09.08.2013 
43  Senior Economist Task Team Leader 09.08.2013 
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44  Senior Operations Officer Trust Fund Coordinator 09.08.2013 
45  Program Officer Task Team Leader 09.08.2013 
46  Resource Management Analyst Task Team Leader 12.08.2013 
47  Operations Officer Central Units 12.08.2013 
48  Senior Partnership Specialist Central Units 13.08.2013 
49  Manager Trust Fund Coordinator 13.08.2013 
50  Senior Partnership Specialist Central Units 13.08.2013 
51  Trust Fund Coordinator Trust Fund Coordinator 14.08.2013 
52  Program Officer Task Team Leader 14.08.2013 
53  Operations Adviser Task Team Leader 15.08.2013 
54  Director Central Units 16.08.2013 
55  Financial Analyst Task Team Leader 16.08.2013 
56  Advisor  19.08.2013 
57  Senior Program Coordinator Task Team Leader 19.08.2013 
58  Senior Adviser  20.08.2013 
59  Adviser  21.08.2013 
60  Adviser  22.08.2013 
61  Head of Operations Task Team Leader 22.08.2013 
62  Trust Fund Coordinator Central Units 23.08.2013 
63  Trust Fund Manager Task Team Leader 23.08.2013 
64  Head Task Team Leader 23.08.2013 
65  Lead Operations Officer Central Units 26.08.2013 
66  Senior Partnership Specialist Trust Fund Coordinator 26.08.2013 
67  Sector Manager Task Team Leader 26.08.2013 
68  Trust Fund Coordinator Trust Fund Coordinator 27.08.2013 
69  Adviser  27.08.2013 
70  Adviser Task Team Leader 27.08.2013 
71  Adviser  27.08.2013 
72  Program Manager Task Team Leader 28.08.2013 
73  Senior Operations Officer Task Team Leader 28.08.2013 
74  Lead Economist Task Team Leader 28.08.2013 
75  Lead Poverty Specialist Task Team Leader 28.08.2013 
 
